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AiLERT Sm N-v Bou-..s
The greater freedom of the courts than formerly from artificial,
technical rules unless restrained by a higher law than that of their own
making, is one of the great changes everywhere seen in modem juris-
prudence. Nevertheless, there are always difficulties in the way of
juridical improvement. Thus in the early days of partnership trans-
actions, the question arose, what is the test of a partnership? It was
soon learned that one might act in such a way toward the outside world
as to create a personal liability as partner, while in fact no such rela-
tion existed between him and his business associates. Leaving out
the latter aspect of his position, what acts, or what kind of an agree-
ment, creates a partnership liability to persons doing business with it?
One of the most common tests was a division of the profits.
On some occasion a clerk was given a share of the profits as com-
pensation for his services, and the concern afterward failed. Of course
the creditors, who in such unlucky ventures always seek to obtain from
the wreck everything they can, sought to hold him as a partner.
Though he did not suppose he was one, nor did the partners, the courts,
so much wiser than they, applied this rule to him and the poor fellow
lost all he had. So in Pennsylvania it was long ago decided' that a
direct participant in profits, as profits, was a partner with respect to
third persons, whatever arrangement might exist between himself and
the partners. This was founded on the English case of Waugh v.
Carver,2 which for a long period was the great landmark in this field
of controversy. Our immediate interest lies in the reason on which
the rule was founded. In an earlier case 3 Chief Justice De Grey had
announced the doctrine "that every man who has a share of the profits
of a trade ought also to bear a share of the loss," the reason for which
was given in Waugh v. Carver that "he who takes a moiety of all
profits indefinitely shall, by operation of law, be made liable to losses,
if losses arise, upon the principle that by taking a part of the profits,
he takes from- the creditors a part of that fund which is the security
to them for the payment of their debts." This reasoning seemed quite
satisfactory to the judicial mind until dissolved by a stronger minded
one with "the short answer," that the reason "was founded on a false
assumption. Creditors neither can, nor do, rely on net profits for
payment."2
5
'Edwards v. Tracy (1869) 62 Pa. 374, 380.
2 (1793, C.P.) 2 H. BI. 235.
'Grace v. Smith (1775, C. P.) 2 W. BI. 998.
'Supra note 2, at p. 247, quoted with approval and followed in Purviance v.
M'Cintee (i82o, Pa.) 6 Serg. & Rawle, 259, 261.
SSmith, J., in Eastman v. Clark (1872) 53 N. H. 276, 285.
[5351
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Another reason holding that the profit sharer may be regarded by
the business world as a partner is worth stating, because it ema.nated
from that great legal luminary Lord Mansfield, though it has a still
weaker foundation. Such a sharer of the net profits, he declared, might
receive usurious interest without any risk. In those days usury was a
crime, and therefore to preserve the receiver from breaking the usury
law he was held as a partner. Poor fellow of a clerk who thus received
as a return for his services a share of the profits; he was truly between
the devil and the deep sea.6 Lord Mansfield's reasoning was severely
criticised by Justice Lindley in his work on Partnership,7 while Judge
Smith makes still shorter work of it, asserting8 that it "does not seem
very forcible. Usury is punished by the refusal of the law to enforce
usurious contracts, or by the imposition of penalties; but it is not cus-
tomary to punish usury by compelling parties to perform contracts
which they never made."
Notwithstanding the unreasonableness of this rule it has been main-
tained until a recent period in some states, the courts declaring that
if a change were needed it was the duty of the legislature- to act; in
other states the courts have changed the rule moved by the more imper-
ative demands of justice. In England Waugh v. Carver9 was overruled
first by the courts,'0 and afterward by statute."
The early English rule was adopted by some of the American states,
notably New York and Pennsylvania;12 after a time began the waver-
ing. Some courts clearly saw that intention should play a larger part
in determining the test, that justice required its application, and acted
accordingly. Other courts just as clearly saw the way of justice but
were overawed by the ancient rule of stare decisis. Judge Folger
voiced this conception of judicial duty in the Leggett case.' 3  "If it
is found that by a long course of decisions, or by long acquiescence in,
and adherence to, a rule some time ago authoritatively promulgated,
there has been established a principle of commercial law upon which
the community has acted, it is the duty of the courts to adhere thereto,
leaving it to the law-making power to find a remedy, if remedy be
needed, in a positive alternative enactment." In sharpest contrast with
this conception of his duty was that of Baron Bramwell in overruling
Waugh v. Carver, declaring as he did so,' 4 that "it had caused more
injustice and mischief than any bad law in our books."
'Blotham v. Pell (1775, C. P.) 2 W. B1. 999.
(5th Eng. ed. 1888) I6.
'Eastnman v. Clark, supra note 5, at p. 286.
'Supra note 2.
" Cox v. Hickman (186o) 8 H. L. Cas. 268; see also: Bullen v. Sharp (1865)
L. R. i C. P. 86; Mollwo v. Court of Wards (1872) L. R. 4 P. C. 419.
'128 & 29 Vict. c. 86.
"Leggett v. Hyde (1874) 58 N. Y. 272, citing the New York cases; Wessels &
Co. v. Weiss & Co. (1895) 166 Pa. 490, 31 Atl. 247, citing the Pennsylvania cases.
' Supra note 12, at p. 277.
"Bullen v. Sharp, supra note IO, at p. 128.
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Even after the old rule had been overthrown by the legislature in
some jurisdictions it retained a latent power. Thus in 187o the Penn-
sylvania legislature enacted that in lending money if a share of the
profits was agreed in writing to be received in lieu of interest, the
lender was not to be held as a partner. 5 Yet the law has been so nar-
rowly construed that it has been largely emptied of its meaning. 6
Justice Fell in reviewing the long series of decisions founded on Waugh
v. Carver clearly showed that the spell of that decision, notwithstanding
the statute, was not yet broken. The entire legal beach is strewn with
wrecked or greatly impaired statutes, driven ashore not by collision
with great constitutional principles, but rather with common-law rules
which courts have deemed the higher wisdom to maintain.
Let us now examine some of the cases in which the courts have not
hesitated to apply the modern rule of intention to test the partnership
relation. In Beecher v. Bush, 7 Justice Cooley, speaking for the higher
court of Michigan, declared that all the cases cannot be reconciled, and
"show that, in so far as the notion ever took hold of the judicial mind
that the question of partnership or no partnership was to be settled
by arbitrary tests it was erroneous and mischievous, and the proper
corrective has been applied. Except when one allows the public or
individual dealers to be deceived by the appearances of partnership
where none exists, he is never to be charged as a partner unless by
contract and with intent he has formed a relation in which the elements
of partnership are to be found. It is nevertheless possible for parties
to intend no partnership and yet to form one. If they agree upon
an arrangement which is a partnership in fact, it is of no importance
that they call it something else, or that they even expressly declare
that they are not to be partners. The law must declare what is the
legal import of their agreement, and names go for nothing when the
substance of the arrangement shows them to be inapplicable. But
every doubtful case must be solved in favor of their intent."
It is worthy of note that three years before Cox v. HickmanI was
decided by the House of Lords the same view was maintained by the
Supreme Court of Tennessee. 9  Judge McKinney, after declaring the
rule and adding that it was consistent with the great rule of construc-
tion-that all agreements are to be expounded according to the mani-
fest intention of the parties-thus continued :20 "in all such cases it is
a question of fact, open to proof in the ordinary modes, whether or not
a partnership exists by the intention and agreement of the parties.
And if the fact be clearly shown not to be so, a mere stipulation, that
"Pa. Laws, 187o, No. 34.
' Wessels & Co. v. Weiss & Co., supra note 12.
S(188) 45 Mich. 188, 200.
"Supra note io.
"Polk v. Buchanan (1857) 5 Sneed, 721.
" Ibid. at p. 728.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
a party shall receive a specific proportion of the net or gross profits
of a business; or, an ascertained amount, payable out of the profits.
as a compensation for services, benefits, or advantages rendered to the
business, will not make such party liable as a partner, to third persons;
provided he has not permitted the use of his name; or suffered him-
self to be held out as a partner to the public."
2
'
When therefore a person shall receive a portion of the profits of a
partnership as compensation for his services he is not a partner; but
hardly had the courts solved that question before they encountered
another quite as difficult to answer. At what stage of the business
shall the profits be ascertained in order to escape liability as a partner?
This question has been considered in many cases, and the brief answer
given in Chapline v. Conant2 2 has been often approved-that unless one
has some ownership in or of the profits as they accrue and are not
ascertained or divided into portions or dividends, he is not a partner.23
Is not the view set forth in Parker v. Canfield24 still more satisfac-
tory? Says Justice Seymour: "The mere use of the expression 'a sum
equal to the profits' in lieu of the word profits does not change the
nature of the contract. There are indeed cases where money secured
may be regarded as a sum measured by profits rather than as profits
themselves; but whether they shall be so regarded depends upon no
arbitrary use of phrases, but upon the nature of the contract and the
real consideration upon which the money is received."
The Uniform Partnership act provides that "the receipt by a person
of a share of the profits of a business is prima facie evidence that he
is a partner in the business, but no such inference shall be drawn if
such profits were received in payment (a) as a debt by installments or
otherwise, (b) as wages of an employee or rent to a landlord, (c) as
an annuity to a widow or representative to a deceased partner, (d) as
interest on a loan, though the amount of payment vary with the profits
of the business, (e) as the consideration for the sale of the good-will
of a business or other property by installments or otherwise. "25
Whether the legislator has succeeded more perfectly than the courts
in solving this fresh problem is receiving daily answer.
Passing from the application of the rule of intention in partnership
formation cases to those of the joint tort-feasors, a still wider and
'See also Cudahy Packiig Co. v. Hibou (19o8) 92 Miss. 234, 46 So. 73;
Estabrook v. Woods (i9o6) 192 Mass. 499, 78 N. E. 538; Langley v. Sanborn
(1908) 135 Wis. 178, H4 N. W. 787; see i Rowley, Partnership (1916) sec. 75;
and elaborate discussion of the subject in Eastman v. Clark, supra note 5.
(1869) 3 W. Va. 507, 519.
See discussion of the question by Wilder, J., in Denny v. Cabot (1843) 47
Mass. 82.
'(1870) 37 Conn. 250, 267.
"Sec. 7, ch. 4.
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more confusing field lies before us. We may begin with the unques-
tioned rule that the injured person can receive only one satisfaction.2 6
There may also be a partial satisfaction from one or more of the tort-
feasors, or from other persons, which operates pro tanto as a satisfac-
tion against the other tort-feasorsY.2
Again a tort-feasor who has been released under seal is generally
deemed to have rendered a complete satisfaction for the tort, as the
seal has the magical effect of importing a consideration, whether it
has been actually paid or not.2 8 In the Gunther case the Maryland Court
expressed the rule as follows :29 "As a consideration is always implied
in a release under seal, though not expressed on its face, the release
by deed of one joint trespasser will discharge all, and this has been
the law since early times." This rule is so artificial that its hoary
antiquity has not preserved it from modern attack as will be seen before
concluding this article.
Let us now glance at the artificial motive of a joint tort. Long ago
Chief Justice Hosmer said :30 "If a trespass is committed by A and B
on the body of another, the acts are distinct. The stroke of A in fact,
not being the stroke of B; and vice versa. But, by operation of law,
these distinct acts are amalgamated, and, in all their parts, become the
united act of both." 'The indivisibility of a tort, committed by two
or more persons, is therefore a mental creation, having no foundation
in fact. The courts have transformed this mental creation into a judi-
cial one, and by so doing, have blocked up their road with an imaginary
mountain. Had they kept clearly in sight the plain rule that there
could be one satisfaction, and one only, coming to the injured party,
no matter from what source, and that this could be given partly by
one, partly by another, the courts would have escaped many of
their difficulties.31 Thus in Gilpatrick v. Hunter, a case often cited,
the court declares 32 that as the tort is joint there "can be no separate
'For cases see 92 An. St. Rep. 873, note; i Jaggard, Torts (1895) sec. 117
et seq.
'Lovejoy v. Murray (1865) 70 U. S. i; Gunther v. Lee (1876) 45 Md. 6o, 67;
Knapp v. Roche (1884) 94 N. Y. 329, 334; Livingston v. Bishop (18o6, N. Y.) i
Johns. 290; Chamberlin v. Murphy (1868) 41 Vt IIO, 118; Eastman v. Grant
(1861) 34 Vt 387, 39o; Randall v. Gerrick (1916) 93 Wash. 522, 161 Pac. 357;
Kropidlowski v. Pfister Leather Co. (1912) 149 Wis. 421, 423, 135 N. W. 839,
840; Ellis v. Esson (88o) 5o Wis. 138, citing many cases.
' Allen v. Ruland (19o6) 79 Conn. 405, 65 Atl. 138; Gunther v .Lee, supra note
27; Bronson v. Fitahugh (1841, N. Y.) i Hill, 185; Irvine v. Millbank (1874,
N. Y.) 15 Abb. Pr. (N. s.) 378; Brown v. Marsh (1835) 7 Vt 320, 327; Bloss v.
Plymale (1869) 3 W. Va. 393, 405; Ellis v. Esson, supra note 27, at p. 146.
" Gunther v. Lee, supra note 27, at p. 67.
'Sheldon v. Kibbe (1819) 3 Conn. 214, 220.
See Dwy v. Connecticut Co. (1914) 89 Conn. 74, 92 At. 883, containing a most
thorough discussion of the subject.
'(2844) 24 Me. I8, 19.
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estimate of the injury committed by each and a recovery accordingly
..... The difficulty in maintaining the suit against the others is, that
the law considers, that the one, who has paid for the injury occasioned
by him, and has been discharged, committed the whole trespass and
occasioned the whole injury, and that he has therefore satisfied the
plaintiff for the whole injury, which he received." The court, there-
fore has transformed its first theory that an indivisible joint tort was
committed, which cannot be divided, into another theory that a joint
tort was not committed, but that it was a single tort committed by the
one who paid for it. But how utterly opposed to fact are these theories
in most cases? No wonder that the courts from an early period sought
to escape from them. We may now begin with the English rule. This
will not detain us long for the work has already been done by a master
hand. Mr. Justice Miller, in Lovejoy v. Murray, after showing that
the English courts had been shifting around like a lost sailor at sea
prior to the decision in Broome v. Wooton, 33 adds34 that even now after
several later attempts to establish a rule, "we are forced to the conclu-
sion that even at this day the doctrine there is neither well settled nor
placed on any satisfactory ground." This utterance was nearly sixty
years ago. Since that time the English courts have continued to
wrestle with the question and in Gilbert v. Finch Judge Haight, speak-
ing for the New York Court of Appeals, said :35 "In England the mod-
ern authorities appear to be quite uniform upon the question. They
are to the effect that, as between joint-debtors and joint tort-feasors,
a release given to one releases all; but if the instrument contains a
reservation of a right to sue the other joint-debtors or tort-feasors,
it is not a release, but, in effect, is a covenant not to sue the person
released, and a covenant not to sue does not release a joint-debtor or
a joint tort-feasor."
Turning now to the American rule Judge Haight showed that the
stream of judicial decision had not always flowed in a uniform current.
Chancellor Kent started right in Kirby v. Taylor86 by holding that a
release was to be construed according to the clear intention of the
parties, and if it contained a reservation, the other obligee was not dis-
charged. Instead of following this rule the court wandered off, but
returned in the Whittemore case,37 Judge Brown declaring that equity
always gives to a release operation according to the intention of the
parties and the justice of the case. The legal rule applied by the courts
of law had been otherwise, he admitted, and that a saving clause repug-
nant to the nature of the grant had been held void and the grant still
' (16o6, K. B.) Yelverton, 67.
"Lovejoy v. Murray, supra note 27, at p. 14.
(19o3) 173 N. Y. 455, 463, 66 N. E. 133, 135.
(I822, N. Y.) 6 Johns. Ch. 242, 253.
W hittemore v. Judd Oil Co. (1891) 124 N. Y. 565, 27 N. E. 24.
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remained absolute and unqualified. Such is not the modern rule of
construction. The rule now held is thus stated :38 "The equitable rule
now prevails and a release is to be construed according to the intent
of the parties and the object and purpose of the instrument, and that
intent will control and limit its operation."
While this is the prevailirig rule and in harmony with the best reason,
the older rule growing out of the indivisibility of a tort is still competing
with the other for judicial acceptance in other jurisdictions. One of
the earlier applications was in Ruble v. Turner."9 The discharge in
that case contained the reservation that the sum paid by the one who
was released "should not be considered as in satisfaction" in favor of
the other tort-feasors. Nevertheless the court, in answer to the ques-
tion, what is the effect of the clause in this instrument in writing, thus
delivers itself: "The law [the italics are those of the court] says, that
if one joint trespasser be released, or make accord and satisfaction,
it shall bar a recovery against all the others. The plaintiff can no more
change the law, in this particular, by any subsequent proviso or con-
dition, than he could, after a grant in fee simple, by deed, restrain
his grantee from selling the lands .... The proviso then is merely void,
and cannot prevent the legal effect of the accord and satisfaction made
by one of the defendants." This reasoning is followed in many of the
subsequent cases releasing the other tort-feasors. This case is more
radical than the succeeding ones in this respect-that the discharge
was not under seal, and therefore the rule of construction invoked by
Judge Tucker 0 "that if there be any clause or condition in a deed,
which is either contrary to law, or repugnant to the nature of the estate
created, it is void"-hardly applies because the controversy in writing
was not a deed, and no consideration expressing a complete satisfac-
tion could be implied because there was no seal. Moreover it may be
noted that Chief Justice Marshall in Garnett v. Macon41 at circuit
wholly ignored the decision and took precisely the opposite view.4 2
McBride v. Scott,43 in which the court squarely held that a release
of one or more joint tort-feasors releases the others, although there
be an agreement in writing that they should not be discharged, states
a rule that has been often followed.44 In the way of fortifying its
Ibid. at p. 574, 27 N. E. at p. 245.
(18o8, Va.) 2 Hen. & Munf. 38, 44.
40Ibid. at p. 44.
4 (1825, So. C.) 2 Brock. 185, 1O Fed. Cas. 12.
4' See McDonald v. Goddard Grocery Co. (1914) 184 Mo. App. 432, 439, 171
S. W. 65o, 653.
,' (19o3) 132 Mich. 176, 93 N. W. 243.
"Se-mlin v. Skutt (903) 133 Mich. 208, 94 N. W. 733; Gilpatrick v. Hunter
(1844) 24 Mo. 18; Brogan v. Hanan (9oo) 55 App. Div. 92, 66 N. Y. Supp.
io66; Mitchell v. Allen (1881, N. Y.) 25 Hun, 543; Ellis v. Bitzer (1825) 2
Ohio, 89; Brown v. Kencheloe (1866, Tenn.) 3 Cald. 192.
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opinion the court declared 45 that to admit of a settlement with one
tort-feasor under such circumstances there presented, and to hold that
a reservation such as was there attempted to save the right as to the
tort-feasors, "would open the door for the plaintiff in any case to
acquire by successive settlements more than just compensation." What
becomes of the great rule, the potency of which none will dispute,
that the injured party is entitled to and can have only one satisfaction?
The court also had another fear if a different rule were adopted which
had been previously expressed by the court in Brown v. Kencheloe46-
that the plaintiff in many instances "would operate upon the fears
of the defendants, and get from each the full amount of the trespass
committed." Fears! but surely their fears would be slight compared
with the absolute cutting off by the courts of the right of the injured
party to proceed against all the wrongdoers to obtain satisfaction.
A few more cases will be briefly mentioned, because they are recent
and show the persistency of some courts to continue to float their deci-
sions on the old water-logged theories. California47 is grimly resist-
ing the strong current of judicial decision in lonely company with the
courts of Colorado4 and Washington. In Abb v. Northern Pacific
Ry.49 the Michigan doctrine was declared to be the law of the latter
state. This case goes a little further than any of the others
we have reviewed. The courts of California, undaunted by' the
strength of the current against them, still continue to head up-
stream. Their courage has been displayed in several cases, notably
in the Chetwood case,50 and still more recently in Flynn v. Morrison.
As a petition to have this cause heard by the Supreme Court was denied,
the decision is conclusive of the law in that state.52
The old rule worked such manifest injustice that the courts at an
early day found a way of circumventing it. Though still clinging to
the doctrine that if the discharge were under seal this imported a full
satisfaction-an artificial rule that will be further considered-when
the discharge was not under seal, the courts did not hesitate to hold
that the intention of the parties must govern. And if the discharge
contained a reservation, whereby one or more of the joint tort-feasors
was not released, the writing was held to be simply a covenant not to
'McBride v. Scott, supra note 43, at p. 182, 93 N. W. at p. 245.
Supra note 44, at p. 200.
'7See notes 50 and 51, infra.
"Ducey v. Patterson (i9o6) 37 Colo. 216, 86 Pac. io9..
(19o2) 28 Wash. 428, 68 Pac. 954; cf. Randall v. Gerrick (1916) 93 Wash.
522, 161 Pac. 357; Betcher v. Kiins (I920, Wash.) 192 Pac. 954.
' Chetwood v. California Nat. Bank (1894) 113 Calif. 414, 45 Pac. 704; cf.
Urton v. Price (881) 57 Calif. 27o.
' (1912) i Calif. App. 400.
'But see Calif. Civ. Code, 1915, sec. 1543. relating to the release of joint
debtors, and Brown v. Pacific Coast Agency (1921, Calif.) 2oo Pac. 977.
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sue the party released, thereby not impairing in any way the rights of
the party injured to proceed against the other tort-feasors.
It will be observed that in applying the prevailing rule, whereby the
discharge operates as a covenant or agreement not to sue the releasee,
the indivisibility of the tort is ignored as completely as its invisibil-
ity; the thing kept before the judicial mind is the satisfaction. If
there has not been a satisfaction, or only a partial one, then the injured
party, unless he has actually and intentionally discharged the others,
may proceed against them to obtain complete satisfaction. In the Abb
case 5 3 the court went still further and held that "when an injured party
makes an estimate of the amount of damages he is willing to receive
from one, and accepts such sum with the agreement that it shall fully
release and discharge the one making the payment, we think it is more
than a mere agreement not to sue. It is a release of his cause of action
in consideration of a satisfaction." Such an agreement may indeed be
a satisfaction and release of the person rendering it, but why should
it operate as a satisfaction from, and discharge of, the others when the
releasor says as plainly as it can be said in words that he intends to hold
them.
In the Gunther case5 4 the discharge worked the release of all parties
because it was under seal, which had the magical effect of being a com-
plete satisfaction, though the parties certainly did not intend that it
should thus operate. But the court said it did, and the intention of the
parties was not permitted to overcome the rule of law. With this as
a correct statement of the law no one will question that "as a considera-
tion is always implied in a release under seal, though not expressed on
its face, the release by deed of one joint trespasser will discharge all."
Concerning this, however, two remarks are in order. First, if the dis-
charge had not been under seal, the consideration would not have been
regarded as a complete satisfaction. By adding a seal, and thereby giv-
ing too much solemnity to the writing, the releasor defeated the very
end he had in view, of getting a partial satisfaction from one of the
parties and further satisfaction from the others. Secondly, the court
threw to the winds that great rule of construction, which applies to
sealed writings as well as to others-that the whole instrument should
be considered and that construction adopted which is most consistent
with its apparent intent. And also another great rule-that if a
deed contains two clauses repugnant to each other, the last will pre-
vail. But, if possible, the repugnant provision should be so construed
as to reach the true intention of the parties, and to accomplish this
purpose the deed should be considered as a whole.55 The court threw
overboard the reservation as surplusage because it contradicted the
Supra note 49, at p. 438.
Supra note 27.
2 Devlin, Real Property and Deeds (3d ed. i9i) sec. 843a.
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first part of the writing, which stated in effect that there had been a
complete satisfaction, and of course, if that were so, no more could
justly be exacted. But if the general rule of construction above noted
had been applied it was manifest from the reservation that there had
been no complete satisfaction, and why should the consideration
received be held to mean so much more than the parties intended? It
is by giving such an undue sanctity to seals, endowing them with a
meaning and force never intended by the users in many cases, that has
led to the modification of their effect by statute as well as by judicial
decision.
The courts generally have regarded written discharges either as tech-
nical releases, or as agreements not to sue. In nearly all cases in which
the releasor has discharged all, this result has been accomplished because
the satisfaction was deemed to be complete. Whatever we may think
of the artificial character of a seal, this rule has been consistently main-
tained in the cases under review. Nevertheless we are justified in
remarking on the irrational character of the rule. For surely it is an
arbitrary thing to cut off the reservation in such a paper in violation
of the great rule of construction applying to intent. And, if permitted
to remain, no contradiction is apparent, and the truth then clearly
appears that the consideration stated in the first part was not a full
satisfaction, and was not intended to be, but only that portion, great
or small, which the releasor intended to exact from the party released.
The repugnancy which is discovered by the judicial eye is of his own
creation, an imaginary thing, having in truth no existence, caused by
construing the instrument contrary to the plain intent of the makers.
Most of the discharges judicially investigated have not been sealed,
and in construing these the rule may thus be stated: When it is evident
that the consideration paid to the plaintiff was not intended to be a full
compensation for his injuries, and the agreement signed by him,
although in the form of a release, was clearly intended to preserve the
liability of those who were not parties to it, many of the courts have
sought to give effect to that intention by construing the agreement as
in legal effect a covenant not to sue the person or persons released,
the releasor thereby not impairing his right to pursue those Who are
not released."8  In the Mlfusoif case5 7 justice Taggard has remarked
'Duck v. Mayen. [1892] 2 Q. B. 511, 514; Price v. Barker (1855, Q. B.) 4 El.
& BI. 760, 777; Carey v. Bilby (1904, C. C. A. 8th) 129 Fed. 203, 63 C. C. A. 361;
Young v. Anderson (1921) 33 Idaho, 522, 196 Pac. 193; Chicago v. Babcock
(1892) 143 Ill. 358, 32 N. E. 271; Chicago & Alton Ry. v. Averill (19o6) 224
Ill. 516, 79 N. E. 654; Renner v. Model Laundry Co. (1921) 191 Iowa, 1288, 1304,
184 N. W. 611, 618; Edens v. Fletcher (9o8) 79 Kan. 139, 98 Pac. 784; Feighley
v. Hoffman & Son Milling Co. (1917) OO Kan. 430, 165 Pac. 276; Matheson v.
O'Kane (I912) 211 Mass. 91, 95, 97 N. E. 638, 639-64o; Johnson v. Von Scholley
(1914) 218 Mass. 454, io6 N. E. 17; Musolf v. Duluth Electric Co. (19o9) io8
Minn. 369, 375, 122 N. W. 499, 501-502; McDonald v. Goddard Grocery Co.
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that the principal controversy is not over the rule itself, whether it is
a release working the discharge of all, or a covenant not to sue and
excluding those mentioned and still holding them liable, "but the means
by which a covenant not to sue is to be distinguished from a release."
If the general rule of interpretation was applied to the usual paper
with a reservation, as was done in the Dwy case,"8 there would be no such
difficulty. The difficulty is created by the court that ignores it. Jus-
tice Taggard contends that if "a given instrument is'in law a release,
it is not material that the parties agreed that it shall not be a release."
But should the court say that in law a paper is a release when the parties
say in words as plainly as they can use that they did not intend it to
release the wrongdoers who are specified? What is the overwhelm-
ing necessity of having the law, made and declared by the court, over-
ride the intention of the parties since the foundation on which the
rule rests'is nothing but a congeries of legal theories having no foun-
dation whatever in fact, but contrary to it? Justice Taggard there-
fore does not hesitate to knock out the reservation just as would be done
with a clause in a partnership agreement affirming that the members
were not to be declared partners. But the analogy is not felicitous,
for the partnership clause is knocked out, not because it is contrary to
the intention of the parties, but because it is not honest to permit the
parties to deny their partnership liability when they are really partners.
By construing the ordinary discharge of a joint tort-feasor according
to the intention of the parties justice is done to all of them. Why
should a forced artificial construction be permitted to prevail over such
a desirable result?
We cannot forbear a restatement of the general rule by the Supreme
Court of West Virginia, that :59 ". . . . A release not under seal of one
joint trespasser or a satisfaction and discharge of the liability against
him, which shows on its face that it was not the intention to satisfy
and discharge the liability of the other joint trespassers will not, and
cannot, be allowed to work a discharge of the action. In other words
that a contract or agreement not unlawful in itself and plain and express
in its terms, shall not be construed, nor made to defeat the object and
intention of the parties, and much less to work a result they sought to
avoid." To this may be added the remark of the Supreme Court of
(1914) 184 Mo. App. 432, 171 S. W. 65o; Stachlin v. Hochdoerfer (921, Mo.)
235 S. W. io6o; Irvine v. Millbank (874) 56 N. Y. 635; Gilbert v. Finch (1903)
173 N. Y. 455, 66 N. E. 133; Walsh v. New York Central Ry. (I912) 204 N. Y.
58, 97 N. E. 408; German American Coffee Co. v. O'Neil (ii8, Sup. Ct.) lo2
Misc. 165, 16p N. Y. Supp. 421; Nashville Interurban Ry. v. Gregory (1916) 137
Tenn. 422, 435, 193 S. W. 1053, io56; Bloss v. Plynale (1869) 3 W. Va. 393;
Ellis v. Esson (88o) 50 Wis. 138.
" Musolf v. Duluth Electric Co., supra note 56, at p. 375, 122, N. W. at p. 502.
'Duy v. Connecticut Co. (914) 89 Conn. 74, 92 AtI. 883.
"Bloss v. Plymale, supra note 56. at p. 4o7.
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Tennessee :80 "It is difficult to see how a simple covenant not to sue
one tort-feasor could affect or reduce the' liability of another tort-
feasor." The theory of the indivisibility of a joint tort did not disturb
the court; indeed in many of the later cases it is not mentioned, and
its uncomfortable presence is evidently fading out of the judicial mind.
As the court said in that case, the important thing is for the courts to
aid the injured person in obtaining complete satisfaction and nothing
more.
Suppose a release or discharge contains no reservation? It then
operates to discharge all the joint tort-feasors. This is the answer by
the highest court of New York," and probably expresses the general
rule.
In strong contrast with the modem course of the courts to ascertain
the intention of the releasor in joint tort cases and to give effect to it
and thereby administer justice, is the course of the courts in a long line
of cases wherein the parties have predetermined the amount of dam-
ages accruing from the non-performance of their contracts. In many
of these the intention of the parties as expressed in their agreements
are as deliberately set aside by the courts in the interest of justice as
they have been ascertained and enforced in the class of cases we have
just reviewed. The legal morass on which we shall now briefly look
is far more extensive than the other, and the desire of the courts to
ascertain and enforce the rights of the parties has been no less clearly
displayed.
In the earlier administration of the common law, when the parties
had stipulated in advance for the payment of a specified sum in the
event of the non-performance of a contract, the courts left the parties
to their own devices and enforced them quite the same as other con-
tracts regardless of consequences to all concerned. The hardships
were so apparent that equity and Parliament came to the rescue of suf-
ferers and granted relief whenever manifest injustice would be wrought
by compelling the rigid enforcement of the intention of the parties in
such cases.62A stipulated sum may be and often is specified as damages which
a party must pay if he fails to perform his contract. Nevertheless, if
he does fail, can he be compelled to pay this sum which he has specified
himself, or is this to be regarded as a penalty for his failure? For,
whenever the later view prevails, then he is required to pay only so
much as justice shall require, that is, to make the injured party good
for the loss he has sustained. This view dearly implies an investiga-
'Nashville Interurban, Ry. v. Gregory, supra note 56, at p. 436, 193 S. W. at
p. 1056.
"Gilbert v. Fintch, supra note 56, at p. 466, 66 N. E. at p. 136; Walsh v. New
York Central Ry. supra note 56, at p. 63, 97 N. E. at p. 410.
"See 2 Williston, Contracts (192o) sec. 775.
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tion by the court and if need be the virtual remaking of the contract
in controversy.
One would think that words mean something, and therefore when a
party promises to give a sum, which he fixes himself, should he fail
to execute his promise, he ought to fulfill it unless prevented by satis-
factory reasons. Nevertheless, "though the intention of the parties
seems clear and manifest that a breach shall operate as a complete for-
feiture of the entire sum named in the agreement, the court will decline
to lend its assistance to enforce the payment of an amount which is
grossly excessive, unreasonable and unjust, and will treat the stipula-
tion as in the nature of a penalty, and will award only such damages
as the injured party may have actually sustained."6 3 Thus have the
courts spoken many times. "Such a stipulation," said Barclay, P. J.,
in May v. Crawford," "is theoretically against the policy of the law
as declared by the courts, which have established a supervision of agree-
ments by a long course of precedents and acquiescence by the people
therein."6
The courts are quite harmonious in holding that in applying the rules
of construction to such contracts, whatever they may be, is the work
of the courts. The earlier doubt shown by some courts has passed
away.66
Let us now state some general principles that may be applied to con-
tracts of this character. First, may be eliminated all cases of fraud,
mistake, circumvention, or oppression.6 7 Second, may be cut off all
cases in which -the stipulated amount of damages is grossly extravagant
and disproportionate to the amount of the loss. The federal rule defin-
ing these is quite in harmony with the rule declared by the state juris-
dictions.68  Third, " a stipulation to pay a specified sum upon the
non-performance of a contract, is regarded as a penalty, rather than
as liquidated damages, if the intention of the parties as to its effect, is
at all doubtful, or is of equivocal interpretation .... The tendency of
late years has been to regard the statements of the parties as to liqui-
dated damages in the light of a penalty unless the contrary intention
is unequivocally expressed, so that harsh provisions will be avoided,
8 Sanders v. Carter (1893) 91 Ga. 450, 453, 17 S. E. 345, 346.
"(1898) I42 Mo. 390, 4O, 44 S. W. 260, 262.
'For cases see io8 Am. St. Rep. 48, note; and 2 Williston, op. cit. supra note
62, sec. 778.
' Pacific Factor Co. v. Adler (i8gi) go Calif. io, 27 Pac. 36; May v. Craw-ford (1899) 15o MO. 504, 532, 51 S. W. 693, 70,; McMillan v. Bowie Nat. Bank(igog) 56 Tex. Civ. App. 45, 119 S. W. 709; Norman v. Vickery. (igio) 6o Tex.Civ. App. 449, 128 S. W. 452; Kollaer v. Puckett (1921, Tex. Civ. App.) 232
S. W. 914.
'Sun Printing & Publishing Assn. v. Moore (19Ol) 183 U. S. 642, 669-670,
22 Sup. Ct. 240, 251; Dakin v. Williams (0837, N. Y.) 17 Wend. 447, 454, and(1839, N. Y.) 22 Wend. 201.
" For cases see io8 Am. St. Rep. 52, note.
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and compensation alone will be awarded."69  Fourth, when the dam-
ages in a case are uncertain in amount and are not readily susceptible
of proof under the rules of evidence, and the parties have agreed upon
a sum as the measure of compensation for a breach of the agreement,
and that sum is not disproportionate to the presumable loss, it may be
recovered as liquidated damages.70 Fifth, in cases wherein the actual
damages do not differ greatly from the amount stipulated, the stip-
ulated sum will be upheld as the legal measure that may be recovered.
In these cases therefore the intention of the parties is executed. The
variation between the actual damage and the stipulated amount is not
great enough to set aside the expressed intention.7 1
In the sixth class of cases the variation in amount between the actual
damage and the stipulated amount in the writing is more serious, is
much larger. In dealing with these cases the federal and state courts
part company. The federal courts quote with approval the view of
Chief Justice Nelson declared in Dakin v. Williams72-- that "A court of
law possesses no dispensing power, it cannot inquire whether the parties
have acted wisely or rashly, in respect to any stipulation they may have
thought proper to introduce into their agreements. If they are com-
petent to contract within the prudential rules the law has fixed as to
the parties, and there has been no fraud, circumvention or illegality in
the case, the court is bound to enforce the agreement." Some of
the state courts also maintain this view.
The federal rule has been declared in several recent cases. In the
Bethlehem Steel case, Mr. Justice Peckham said :73 "The courts at one
time seemed to be quite strong in their views and would scarcely admit
that there ever was a valid contract providing for liquidated damages.
Their tendency was to construe the language as a penalty, so that noth-
ing but the actual damages sustained by the party aggrieved could be
recovered." The old rule has been so modified that the courts will
"Willson v. Mayor & City Council (1896) 83 Md. 293, 211, 34 At. 774, 775;
cf. Mt. Airy Milling & Grain Co. v. Runkles (1912) 11S Md. 371, 84 AtI. 533;
Stratton v. Fike (igog) 166 Ala. 203, 51 So. 874; see 2 Williston, op. cit. supra
note 62, sec. 788.
" Monmouth Park Assn. v. Wallis Iron Works (1892) 55 N. J. L. 132, 141, 26
Atl. 140, 143; City of New Britain v. New Britain Telephone Co. (1902) 74
Conn. 326, 333, 5o Atl. 881, 884, and cases cited; Banta v. Stamford Motor Co.
(1914) 89 Conn. 51, 92 Ad. 665; Hennessy v. Metzger (1894) 152 Ill. 505, 38 N. E.
l058; Weiss v. United States Fidelity Co. (1921) 300 IIl. I1, 132 N. E. 749.
*'Mansur Implement Co. v. Tissier Arms Co. (1903) 136 Ala. 597, 3 So. 818;
Keeble v. Keeble (888) 85 Ala. 552, 557, and cases cited; Lee v. Over street
(1871) 44 Ga. 507; St. Louis Ry. v. Shbemaker (18,82) 27 Kan. 677; Noble v.
Sturmn (1920) 210 Mich. 462, 178 N. W. 99; Mason v. Callender (1858) 2 Minn.
350; Hill v. Wertheimner-Swarts Shoe Co. (1889) 15o Mo. 483, 51 S. W. 702.
' Supra note 67, 17 Wend. at p. 452.
"' United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co. (19o7) 2o5 U. S. m05, i19, 27 Sup. Ct.
450, 455.
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now try to ascertain what agreement the parties have made, "to ascer-
tain what their intention was when they inserted such a stipulation for
payment, of a designated sum or upon a designated basis, for a breach
of a covenant of their contract, precisely as they seek for the intention
of the parties in other respects." The court, in a later case, speaking
through Mr. Justice Clarke, says : "When that intention is clearly
ascertainable from the writing, effect will be given to the provision, as
freely as to any other, where the damages are uncertain in nature or
amount or are difficult of ascertainment or where the amount stipulated
for is not so extravagant, or disproportionate to the amount of property
loss, as to show that compensation was not the object aimed at, or as
to imply fraud, mistake, circumvention or oppression.
75
In clear opposition to this view is another which has been stated by
Judge Christiancy, speaking for the Supreme Court of Michigan,
whose words have been often quoted with approval: "The law, follow-
ing the dictates of equity and natural justice, in cases of this kind,
adopts the principle of just compensation for the loss or injury actually
sustaiied; considering it no greater violation of this principle to con-
fine the injured party to the recovery of less, than to enable him, by
the aid of the court, to extort more. It is the application in a court
of law, of that principle long recognized in courts of equity, which, dis-
regarding the penalty of the bond, gives only the damages actually sus-
tained."76  The italics are those of the court and bring out still more
clearly, if possible, that the ascertainment and enforcement of justice
in this class of cases is the paramount idea in the judicial mind.
In applying these rules it may be noted that wherever the federal
rule prevails, no distinction is drawn between the last three rules; all
are regarded as a single rule that must be applied whenever the inten-
tion of the parties to the agreement must be carried out. The parties
having made a lawful agreement, the courts will not undo their work
and make another for them on the supposition they did not know what
they were about, or that the court can act more wisely for them than
they can act for themselves. In thus deciding the courts are also
moved by the idea, if not always expressed, that if the parties acted
hastily, thoughtlessly, so long as no fraud was lurking around, they
ought to pay the cost, even though it be a heavy one, for thus acting
without proper deliberation. This reasoning perhaps may seem to pos-
sess still greater force when it is remembered that many of the writings
are drawn by lawyers who well know the rules of the law that apply
" Wise v. United States (1919) 249 U. S. 361, 365, 39 Sup. Ct. 303, 304.
'Jewett, Bigelow & Brooks v. Detroit Edison Co. (1921, C. C. A. 6th) 274
Fed. 30. Certiorari was denied. Detroit Edison Co. v. Jewett, Bigelow & Brooks
(1921) 257 U. S. 641, 42 Sup. Ct. 52.
'
6 Jaquith v. Hudson (858) 5 Mich. 123, 133. For later Michigan cases, see
Calbeck v. Ford (19o5) 14o Mich. 48, io3 N. W. 516; Ross v. Loescher (19o8)
152 Mich. 386, 116 N. W. 193; Noble v. Sturm, supra note 71.
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to the terms of penalties and stipulated damages. There is, however,
A different way of looking at parties and lawyers at the time of draw-
ing these instruments that will be soon noticed.
Again, a doubt may be raised whether there is enough difference
between the rules above given to constitute distinct rules of interpre-
tation and application. How great must be the disproportion between
the actual and stipulated damage in a given case to lead a court to dis-
regard the rule of intention and apply the rule of justice to it. The
best answer is found in a study of the cases.
Let us now inquire into the course of the state jurisdictions in apply-
ing these rules. The deliverance of Chief Justice Nelson in Dakin v.
Williams, 77 quoted with approval by Mr. justice White7 cannot be
regarded as an expression of the existing New York rule, whatever
be the force given to it as a federal opinion. It is true that in a later
case the Court of Appeals, speaking through judge Wright, did say :79
"When the parties to a contract in which the damages to be ascertained,
growing out of a breach, are uncertain in amount, mutually agree that
a certain sum shall be the damages in case of a failure to perform, and
in language plainly expressive of such agreement, I know of no sound
principle or rule applicable to the construction of contracts, that will
enable a court of law to say that they intended something else." But
he adds: "Where the sum fixed is greatly disproportionate to the pre-
sumed actual damages, probably a court of equity may relieve." This
case from the legal point of view sustains the federal rule, but viewed
in the light of equity sustains the rule of justice. This distinction must
be kept in mind in studying the older cases where chancery Jurisdiction
prevailed.
The later New York view is, we think, embodied in Perley v.
Schubert,8" in which the court, after remarking that the counsel had
cited 'a multitude of cases" to assist the court in determining whether
the clause in the controverted agreement was to be interpreted as
liquidated damages or a penalty, and that "all of these cases and many
more" had been examined by the court, conclude: "From them has
been deduced one rule, at least, in which they all agree, and about
which there can be no doubt, and that is, that in the construction of
such provisions the actual intention of the parties, so far as it can rea-
sonably and fairly be ascertained from the language of the contract
and from the nature of the surrounding circumstances, is to be con-
sidered; in other words, that each case is to be considered in the light
of its own facts."
In a well considered case of earlier date, the court took a similar view.
"In the earlier cases," said Justice Agnew,8' "the courts gave more
' Supra note 67, 17 Wend. at p. 449.
"Sun Printing & Publ. Assn. v. Moore, loc. cit. supra note 67.
Clement v. Cash (186o) 21 N. Y. 253, 257.
o (i9o7) 121 App. Div. 786, 79o, io6 N. Y. Supp. 593, 596.
Streeper v. Williams (1865) 48 Pa. 450, 454.
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weight to the language of the clause designating the sum as a penalty
or as liquidated damages. The modern authorities attach greater
importance to the meaning and intention of the parties; yet the inten-
tion is not all-controlling, for in some cases the subject matter and
surroundings of the contract will control the intention where equity
absolutely demands it."
In Giesecke v. Cullerton,8 2 Chief Justice Carter, after saying that no
branch of the law is involved in more obscurity by contradictory deci-
sions than whether sums specified in an agreement to secure perform-
ance will be treated as liquidated damages or a penalty declared that
"each case must depend upon its own peculiar and attendant circum-
stances, and that therefore general rules of law on the subject are
often of a very little practical utility. While the intention of the par-
ties must be taken into consideration, the language of the contract is
not conclusive. The courts of this State, as well as in other jurisdic-
tions, lean towards a construction which excludes the idea of liquidated
damages and permits the parties to recover only the damages actually
sustained. . . .The great weight of authority in this and other juris-
dictions is based upon the principle that a stipulated sum will not be
allowed as liquidated damages unless it may be fairly allowed as com-
pensation for the breach." The courts of Illinois have done their full
share of wabbling on this question, but the above deliverance is the last
pronouncement and is in harmony with the modem current of the
decisions.
The opinion held by the Supreme Court of Texas83 should find a
place in this too brief review. If the damages are in their nature uncer-
tain, or their amount indeterminate, the sum specified is treated as
fixing by stipulation the amount of the recovery. That is in harmony
with the general rule. "But the difliiulty arises in cases in which the
damages are reasonably susceptible of ascertainment." After remark-
ing that it would seem that if the expressed intention of the parties to
a contract should be given in every case, yet the principle would appear
to be, that although a sum be named as liquidated damages the courts
will not so treat it, unless it bear such proportion to the actual damages
that it may reasonably be presumed to have been arrived at upon
a fair estimation by the parties of the compensation to be paid for the
prospective loss."
The courts that have shown the strongest inclination to enforce the
intention of the parties as expressed in their agreements, in harmony
with the federal courts, are Massachusetts, Maine, and Ohio.84 Thus,
in Guerin v. Stacy Chief Justice Holmes says:85 "But we heartily agree
(1917) 280 11. 510, 513, 117 N. E. 777, 778.
Collier v. Betterton (1895) 87 Tex. 442, 29 S. W. 467.
8 Garst v. Harris (igoo) 177 Mass. 72, 58 N. E. 174; Dwinel v. Browa (1867)
54 Me. 468; Knox Rock Blasting Co. v. Grafton Stone Co. (igoi) 64 Ohio St.
361, 6o N. E. 563.
'(09oo) 175 Mass. 595, 596, 56 N. E. 892.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
with the Court of Appeals in England that so far as precedent permits,
the proper course is to enforce contracts according to their plain mean-
ing and not to undertake to be wiser than the parties, and therefore
that in general where parties say that a sum is payable as liquidated
damages they will be taken to mean what they say and will be held to
their word. Wallis v. Smith, 21 Ch. D. 243. Atkyns v. Kinnier, 4
Exch. 776, 783. In the language of Baron Parke in the case last
cited, 'If there be a contract consisting of one or more stipulations,
the breach of which cannot be measured,' as in theory of law the dam-
age caused by the failure to pay money can be, 'then the parties must
be taken to have meant that the sum agreed on was to be liquidated
damages and not a penalty.' "
A final reflection may be added on the action of the courts in thus
setting aside so freely the intentions of the parties expressed in this
class of agreements, while they are so mindful universally to ascertain
and enforce them save in exceptional cases in all other classes. In
thus enforcing them in conformity with justice do they not carry out
the real intentions of the parties, not indeed as expressed in words, but
quite as real as if they were thus expressed? These writings are
usually drawn by lawyers who are familiar with the rules of law we
have had under review. If the parties concerned had drawn their
agreements themselves, very likely the measure of damages would have
received greater consideration. But in the light of the rules of law,
stated to them by their lawyers, that any large variation of damages
that might be sustained, beyond the amount fixed, would be ascertained
by the court if the parties themselves could not agree on the amount,
the old phrases and forms have still been continued in use. Why have
they not been changed? Because doubtless nothing better can be
invented. While it is true that the courts do remake many of these
contracts, they are doing, after all, only what the parties expect will
be done whenever they themselves fail to agree on the damages that
must be paid as a consequence of not fulfilling their contracts. Is not
the criticism of Chief Justice Holmes in the Guerin case, 6 above men-
tioned, without any real foundation? Are not the courts, who are
executing the real deeper intentions of the parties rather than the bald
literal ones expressed in writing, fully justified in so doing by a long
course of decisions and by the expectation of all who are concerned in
preparing and executing such agreements?
8o Supra note 85.
